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1 Introduction
This article sets out some ideas for a law in
development research agenda that focuses on how
law affects the life choices of poorer sectors of
society This is not an effort to build a populist
'people-centred' research agenda. Rather, it is an
attempt to construct an agenda that identifies, in a
rigorous and systematic way, the causal
mechanisms through which law actually influences
how people invest their resources in productive
enterprises to create wealth and in political
enterprises to create voice. lt is impossible to
construct such a 'law-in-development' research
agenda without, if not an answer, at least an
approach to finding an answer to the following
question: how much does law really matter? That
is, how much causal weight should we accord legal
factors when explaining either large social
outcomes or the economic and political decision
making of ordinary people?
The growing number of internationally supported
judicial reform initiatives and access-to-justice
programmes are premised on the idea that
substantive legal rules and the structure of legal
institutions matter a great deal. In international
development circles there is agreement: law, if
properly 'designed' and 'implemented', can be a
force for progressive social change. As Benda-
Beckmann (1989:130) observes, such a view is
premised on 'the idea that legal structures and
norms directly cause or determine action and its
consequences'. Much evidence suggests, however,
that how law operates in practice varies
considerably across geographic and social space -
that is, across national territory and systems of
social stratification such as gender, class and
ethnicity Similar legal rules and institutions have
dramatically different consequences for different-
ially situated groups.
Explaining why this variation exists is central to
identifying how much law matters and a crucial
step in constructing a law-in-development research
agenda. This article sketches sorne preliminary
ideas on why this variation exists, and hence on the
relationship between law and development. It
develops a view of law that is, broadly speaking,
relational and focused on socio-legal practices that
emerge out of the interactions between agents of the
state and actors in society, as both seek to interpret
and use legal rules. This view is illustrated by
looking at how law influences the forms of collective
action resource-poor groups engage in. The final
section outlines a research agenda of law in
development that emerges from such a view of law.
2 Law as Social Regulation
Law is most often conceived as an indispensable
component of the modem state. The rule of law - its
promise of eliminating the arbitrary use of power and
rule by knowable and impersonal rules, applied
universally and uniformly across all regions and
social strata - is one of the principle bases of
legitimacy of the state and of public action.2
Furthermore, it is through law that the state
maintains cohesion between its departments and
agencies and 'pursues concrete objectives of political,
ethical, utilitarian or some other kind' (Weber
1978:644-5). Law as a component of the state is a
set of formal rules, and the application of those rules
by public officials, which attempt to regulate social
life and reproduce particular social and power
relations, including through dispute resolution.
State law, however, is only one of many mechanisms
through which social regulation takes place. Weber
and many since have argued that territorially
defined societies have a multiplicity of regulatory
orders (sets of rules that regulate, and hence shape,
social behaviour), and that these orders often
compete with each other.3 The interaction between
regulatory orders is centrally a struggle over the
distribution of power within a society - whose rules
will govern behaviour. The assertion of the
dominance of state law has been highly uneven in
all regions of the world, and the reach and relevance
of such law varies greatly within, and between,
societies. Vanderlinden points out that, in reality,
the individual is 'the converging point of the
multiple regulatory orders which each social
network [in which the individual participates[
necessarily include' (1989:15 1). As a result:
When people make decisions about how to invest
scarce resources, they weigh the consequences in
relation to the different regulatory orders in which
they are embedded.
If the above statement is true, the implications for
research on law in development, and for access to
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justice and judicial reform programmes, are
significant. lt suggests that one of the central
challenges researchers and policy makers face in
understanding how law influences life choices is to
locate people and groups in the web of sometimes
complementary and sometimes competing
regulatory orders (including increasingly
transnational ones created by international treaties,
protocols, and accords; see Baxi and Newell in this
volume). This requires that we undertake the
difficult task of exploring the interaction between
formal state law and other sets of rules. For policy
makers the above statement suggests that people
may choose not to use state law irrespective of
having either 'access' to the judiciary or legally
guaranteed rights. This is, for example, what Nader
(1990) found in her study of a Zapotec village in
Mexico. In order to preserve village autonomy from
the Mexican state, villagers did their best to settle
disputes locally and avoid contact with the state
justice system.
3 Law as Institution
What kind of regulatory order is law? However we
construct our law-in-development agenda, it will be
built on a particular understanding of what law is,
how law changes and the relationship between law
and the processes of social change we commonly
call development.
The new institutionalism offers an especially useful
point of departure for developing an understanding
of law that highlights its role in shaping people's life
choices. This body of work focuses much attention
on how institutions influence people's and
organisations definition of goals (i.e. preferences)
and strategies for achieving those goals.4 Institutions
are defined in one of two ways: either narrowly as
the formal and informal 'rules of the game' (e.g. the
institution of private property), or more broadly as
large organisational structures (such as the state and
the party system). In both cases institutions are
seen as a template for demands (or group identities)
and a resource for and constraint on action.
To see how institutions influence the choices people
make we can look specifically at how law as
institution (in the latter of the two definitions)
shapes collective action by less powerful groups to
make claims in the political system. In the case of
poor people, because they are the most vulnerable
sector of society, law exercises a particularly
significant influence. Poor social groups tend to
tailor their forms of organisation, demands and
strategies to fit existing law, engaging in legally
protected forms of collective action (Houtzager
2001; McAdam 1982; McCann 1998).
Law, understood as a set of legal rules and the
organisations of the justice system, favours certain
forms of organising, certain types of claims, and
certain strategies of claim making. First, legislation
granting rights and entitlements creates collective
interests. Such interests often cut across existing,
more localised, social cleavages and provide new
bases on which fragmented communities can build
unity For example, legislation in Brazil which
created the legal category rural worker (the Rural
Workers Statute of 1963), and granted this category
a particular set of privileges, significantly influenced
the emergence of Latin America's largest rural
movement, built around a collective identity as
rural workers. This identity superseded many
regional identities and united politically diverse
rural social categories. Paradoxically, the Rural
Workers' Union Movement (Movimento Sindical
dos Trabalhadores Rurais) consisted mostly of small
farmers and peasants of various sorts, although it
did include important groups of agricultural
labourers and plantation workers (Houtzager 1998,
2001).
Second, defining demands and forms of
organisation to 'fit' existing rights and widely
accepted claims, and selecting carefully on which
authorities to make claims (by tailoring demands
accordingly), reduces the cost of collective action
and increases the likelihood of success. It reduces
the risk of repression (because repressing what is
perceived as legally sanctioned, hence legitimate,
political activity is costly to authorities). For the
same reasons it also increases the likelihood of
attracting support from other social groups. This is
important because there is ample historical
evidence to suggest that only in instances where
broad coalitions of the poor succeed in attracting
the support of critical élite and non-élite allies are
they likely to gain political influence at the national
level. It also provides leverage vis-ä-vis other, more
powerful, actors. Scheingold, for example, suggests
that marginalised groups can 'capitalize on the
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perception of entitlements associated with (legal)
rights to initiate and sustain political mobilization'
and draw on legal discourse 'to name and challenge
existing social wrongs or injustices' (cited in
McCann 1998:83). This in effect turns 'the rules
against the rulers' (McCann 1998:89) in a process
Scott (1985:337-8) captures particularly well. All
dominant ideologies, Scott argues, seek to legitimise
the way power is exercised by making universal
claims: 'a hegemonie ideology requires, by
definition, that what are in fact particular interests
be reformulated and presented as general interests.'
Hence, claims by subordinate groups, 'can be said
to arise from the inevitable gap between the
promises that any hegemony necessarily makes and
the equally inevitable failure of the social order to
fulfil some or all of these promises.' In so far as
legislation and legal norms embody the unfulfilled
promises of the dominant ideology, people may feel
aggrieved when these are not kept and mobilise
politically to demand 'their rights'.
Brazil rural worker movement, for example, up
until recently carefully formulated its demands in
terms of the rights and entitlements spelled out in
the 1963 Rural Workers Statute and the 1964 Land
Statute. During the 1970s, a decade of military rule
in Brazil, it in fact launched a 'campaign for rights'
to fight the arbitrary power of landowners through
labour courts and to pressure for the enforcement of
national legislation over the private law of local
potentates (Houtzager 1998).
Marx (1998) study of race relation in the United
States, South Africa, and Brazil shows how even
legal categories, meant to exclude particular groups,
on a racial basis in this case, can become templates
for demand making and collective identities. Even
though 'state-sanctioned racial categories impose
real costs on their subjects', he (1998:6) found that
they also 'offer oppressed populations both legal
grounds for redress and bases for political
mobilization', including by legitimising subordinate
racial identities as a basis for collective action. The
presence of racial domination, as state policy
encoded in law, in South Africa and the United
States helps explain why subordinated racial identity
became the basis for resistance in these countries
(expressed in the African National Congress and the
civil rights movement); its absence in Brazil has
contributed to the failure of such identities and
movements to develop despite a large and
subordinated black population.
The ïnstitutionalist view of law means abandoning
the often instrumentalist understanding of law held
by many social scientists, officials in multi- and bi-
lateral institutions and policy makers. In the latter
conception, law is a relatively straight-forward
instrument of social engineering. The causal arrow
points from legal rules and admin-istrative
procedures to forms of behaviour. Legisl-ative
action is indeed enacted with the intent of altering
or reinforcing existing social behaviour; similarly
with reform of judicial and administrative
organisations. Law as practice, as experienced by
people in the everyday, however, is the product of
far more complex processes involved in the creation
of legal rules and their interpretation.
The institutionalist view of law is itself unable to
capture much of this complexity Lets therefore
move forward with an observation from the
literature on judicial institutions and research on
law and society: legal rules are not self-enforcing.
The observation is obvious but has important
implications. It suggests we should distinguish
between substantive rules (i.e. legal doctrine) and
compliance with (or enforcement of) such rules
(Edelman, Ugger and Erlanger 1999:407). People
do not encounter legal rules themselves in their
interactions with agents of the state and each other,
but interpretations of what constitutes enforcement
of, and compliance with, these rules.7 Interpret-
ations are constructed as different actors attempt to
create readings of legal doctrine that are favourable
to their concerns. Implicated in this process are
both agents of the state (such as judges, police and
administrative officials who adjudicate, enforce and
apply legal rules) and societal actors, who either
seek to comply with or to use law in their dealings
with others. These acts of interpret-ation around
enforcement and compliance produce what we can
call sets of socio-legal practices.
At a high level of generality we can think of law as
the outcome of the interaction between groups of
people in (i) the making of substantive legal norms
and (ii) the everyday socio-legal practices through
which those norms are enforced and complied with,
involving judicial and administrative action by
agents of the state. When such a set of practices is
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reproduced over time so that they acquire a degree
of solidity' for people, allowing them adjust
expectations and plan future actions around them,
then we can speak of law as institution (or of
institutionalised practices) (Stinchcombe 1997:
391). Legislation that is either not enforced (or,
conversely, widely ignored), as is the case with
many formal legal rules in all countries, falls outside
of this definition of law.
We know that the interactions surrounding rule
making and the construction of enforcement!
compliance occurs between people with unequal
power and access to resources, who are embedded
in multiple regulatory orders, and who
consequently have different opportunities to either
exit or engage in interpreting substantive law. lt is
not by chance that the legal construction of
property, and the interpretations and enforcement
of the rules regulating private property, favour
particular classes.
There is no theory of law as practice. Nor is there a
framework for understanding how such practices
emerge out of the interactions between unequal
groups. Developing such a theory or framework of
course lies beyond the ambitions of this short
article. Instead the next section offers a number of
illustrations of some of the processes involved in
making, interpreting and enforcing/complying with
legal rules. The examples will help make concrete
what has been a discussion at a perilously high level
of generality Much of the focus is on the ability of
the poor to use law to expand their life choices, in
particular through collective action to make public
claims. For poor or vulnerable social groups,
collective action, as well as collective legal
mobilisation by networks of lawyers and activists,
have been vital ways to challenge interpretation and
enforcement of legal rules, as well as win the
creation of more favourable rules.
4 Illustrations
The first illustration highlights the extent to which
legal rules are subject to (re)interpretation and how
judicial interpretation can spill over into what
Feeley and Rubin (1999) call judicial policy
making' - that is, the creation of new legal rules by
judges. Between the 1930s and early 1960s federal
judges in the United States consistently dismissed
suits by prisoners challenging what were often
horrific prison conditions, particularly in the
southern states. Federal courts held that prisoners
did not have justiciable rights - the courts lacked
jurisdiction in such suits because 'prison conditions
were not subject to constitutional review' (13). In
the 1960s federal judges shifted gear dramatically
and began to interpret the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against 'cruel and unusual punishment'
as granting them jurisdiction to rule on the
constitutionality of entire prison systems.
Feeley and Rubin (1999:14) point out that the
Eighth Amendment does not mention prisons and
sets only very general boundaries for the exercise of
judicial review over forms of punishment. Over the
next decade, however, federal judges filled this legal
void through a series of rulings that 'fashioned a
comprehensive set of judicially enforceable rules for
the governance of American prisons' (14).
According to the author admittedly judge-centred
account, in the absence of legal text these rulings
were based on the recommendations of the different
actors (such as the Federal Bureau of Prisons and
the American Correctional Association), congru-
ence with basic legal principles, and judges' own
notions of what constituted desirable social
outcomes. By 1985 prisons in thirty-five of the fifty
states and the entire correctional systems of nine
states, 'had been placed under comprehensive court
orders, [many of which] specified such details of
institutional administration as the square footage of
the cells, the nutritional content of the meals, the
number of times each prisoner could shower, and
the wattage of lïght bulbs in prisoners' cells' (13).
The second illustration highlights how the role of
social movements and sustained legal mobilisation
have been crucial in constructing interpretations of
legal doctrine favourable to vulnerable groups and
the processes by which rights are made real for
ordinary people. McCann (1998:93) retells how the
US Supreme Court outlawed public segregation in
the 1950s, but that its rulings 'mostly generated
hostility or apathy in the South [and] compliance
with the courts was very low.' To simplify a
complicated story, the court rulings, such as Brown
vs. Board of Education, helped produce a mutually
reinforcing combination of local confrontations by
the civil rights movement, Northern public opinion
favourable to change, and resolve among important
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federal officials that greater federal intervention was
necessary to enforce the new legal rules. This mix of
judicial action, social movement demand making
from below and federal government intervention
produced substantial and progressive change in law
as practice. Studies of the enforcement of, and
respect for, other types of rights also suggest that
the realisation of legal rights by less powerful
groups often occurs only when sustained collective
legal mobilisationfrom below takes place and targets
both judicial and administrative agencies of the
state (Epp 1998; Hart 1991; McCann 1994).
The third illustration, from Brazil, shows how non-
legal factors influence the ability of the poor to use
law to engage in collective claim making. In the
period spanning 1955-1990 segments of the rural
poor in Brazil organised in a variety of ways to
improve both the economic and political choices
open to them. The organisational forms their
movements took, the nature of their demands and
the strategies they pursued, consistently reflected
particular features of the legal system.
Between 1955 and 1962, sharecroppers, tenant
farmers and other rural poor organised in legally
sanctioned civil associations to contest arbitrary
police action, violence committed by landowners
and, in the northeast of the country, the abolition of
the cambao (an institution similar to the feudal
corveé requiring various types of 'tenants' to
provide days of free labour in addition to rents).
The organisational form and legal strategy of these
groups seem paradoxical because the civil code and
the judiciary were highly conservative. Further-
more, the state's ability (or willingness) to enforce
national law over local private regulatory orders was
very weak in most of the countryside. The state,
and hence state law, had only a tenuous presence in
rural areas - social regulation was dominated by
powerful local landholding families and maintained
through a combination of patronclient networks,
popular religiosity and violence.
Nonetheless, in the northeast of Brazil, the most
dynamic organising pole during this period,
associations popularly known as peasant leagues
registered under the civil code and brought suits in
court on a host of issues. A former leader observes
that, despite the stateS inaction, 'the leaders of the
Leagues recognised the existence of a historic
contradiction between the law of the liberal
bourgeoisie ..., i.e. the Civil Code, and the react-
ionary, traditional norms of the latifundistas'
(Moraes 1970:470). Along with providing various
social services the leagues sought to 'deferid the
legitimate rights in accordance with the national
laws of the country' and engaged in various forms
of public actions that sought legal change by
pressuring the state legislature, the governor, the
courts and public opinion, particularly around the
issue of agrarian reform (Novaes 1997:38; Ricci
1999:68).
Although the labour code allowed for rural unions,
and labour tribunals were considered less
conservative than their civil counterparts, unions
were not favoured as an organisational form.
Registration under the labour code was difficult and
the regulation of such unions was under the
purview of the Ministry of Agriculture (not the
Ministry of Labour), where the influence of sugar
and coffee planters dominated and virtually
ensured that existing legal rights and norms would
not be enforced (Moraes 1970:456).
The leagues' strategy was possible, and had some
success, because various urban actors became allies
and legal mediators, giving peasants unprecedented
access to the courts, as well as political support.
Furthermore, the governor elected in 1958, an
industrialist, refused to use the coercive apparatus
of the state to quell the peasant leagues. This
marked a substantial break with the past and in
effect made the state a law-bound entity in ways it
had not been previously Although state capacity to
enforce the law and protect civil and political rights
remained weak, Moraes (1970:477) observes that 'a
marked change in the political atmosphere could be
felt ... for the first time. Democratic liberties
increased.' These political changes made the use of
law a viable, even sensible, strategy
Around 1962 the pattern of organising inverted
completely: civil associations were replaced by rural
worker unions, the labour code and labour courts
became a key, though not the only channel for legal
mobilisation. Why the change? New legislation (the
Rural Workers Statute of 1963) came into force that
made registration of rural worker unions easier,
expanded the rights to which rural workers were
entitled and brought regulation of rural unions
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under the purview of the Ministry of Labour.8 The
unions benefited from state resources (the union tax)
and some degree of protection, and labour courts
(tripartite 'boards' in which officials from the
Ministry of Labour, union movement and employers
are represented) in general were more responsive to
the concerns and demands of 'workers' than their
civil counterparts (Moura 1988; Novaes 1997). In
this context the civil code was no longer an attractive
regulatory order through which to challenge the
power of landowners. Civil associations were quickly
converted into rural worker unions and registered
under the labour code.
The impact of these legal changes on rural
organising and claim making, however, varied
significantly over the next decades. Between 1962
and 1964, in the context of a highly competitive
democratic regime, the changes in labour law
provoked a surge in rural unionisation. Available
allies and legal mediators multiplied in this
environment. The Rural Workers' Union Movement
that emerged out of this process sought to draw the
state into mediating rural social relations. It used
the labour courts to demand the full
implementation of national labour legislation,
organised sector-wide strikes that forced the
Ministry of Labour to intervene and negotiate new
collective agreements, and mobilised to make rights
claims and demand for agrarian reform (Palmeira
1985; Pereira 1997).
The onset of authoritarian rule in 1964 dramatically
altered how peasant groups experienced and used
law. On the one hand, the military initiated a major
episode of state-building and greatly expanded the
reach of the national state, making important parts
of national legislation real for the first time in rural
areas. State agencies, and even local government in
particular regions, lost some of their 'private'
character, became more law-bound and gained
greater capacity to enforce national law. (The extent
to which this occurred varied significantly from
region to region, however.) On the other hand, basic
civil and political rights were routinely violated and
collective demand making outside of formal
institutional channels was repressed. The cost of
collective action therefore rose significantly and the
movements strategy shifted from strikes and public
demonstrations to bringing individual suits in the
labour courts and lobbying state officials.
The political opening initiating BraziFs slow
democratic transition led to the reappearance of
movement allies, while the state as a whole grew
more law-bound in the sense of respecting civil and
political rights. Major change in legislation came
only in 1988, with a new constitution, butin this
new political context the Rural Workers' Union
Movement initiated a wave of public claim making.
The first of these were large sector-wide strikes in
the sugar-cane plantations of Pernambuco
(1979-80), which strictly adhered to the military's
cumbersome strike law - the Ministry of Labour not
only supervised the strikes but went so far as to
reign in abusive local police (Pereira 1997). An
important shift in the goals of collective claim
making occurred - from manoeuvring within legal
rules to trying to rewrite the rules themselves by
lobbying state assemblies, the national Congress,
and public opinion. Paradoxically, the state's ability
to enforce national law entered into a period of
significant decline in the 1980s, limiting the efficacy
of the movement more aggressive and sophist-
icated use of law and contributing to a surge in
private violence against peasants and rural
movements.
5 Towards a Research Agenda
Three comparative research programmes emerge
out of a view of law as practices. The first is to
examine what factors influence the ability of
differentially situated groups to use law in ways that
enhance their life choices - that is, to create choices
that lead to greater accumulation of economic and
political resources. The second is to look more
broadly at how law constrains and facilitates the
partIcular forms of economic and political
behaviour of these social groups. Such research
would highlight how legal practices vary across
systems of stratification (by gender, class, ethnicity,
and so on) and what role they play in maintaining
such systems.9 The third programme explores how
large historical processes, such as urbanisation, the
expansion of the market and economic
globalisation (to name but a few) alter legal pract-
ices and who can use law.
lt won't escape notice that national law, rather than
other regulatory orders, is the point of departure for
the law-in-development agenda suggested here.
The relative primacy of national law over other
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regulatory systems is a peculiar historical outcome
that involved a long process of political struggle,
often in its most primal and violent form Yet two
reasons impel us to begin our research here.
First, regulatory orders are first and foremost about
the distribution of power and the enforcement of
forms of social stratification - they privilege the
power of some over that of others. The idea of
citizenship entailed in national law provides the
basis, however partial and imperfect in practice, of
legal equality This limited form of equality has in
many (and diverse) instances freed people from
'local tyrannies' and been important in improving
the welfare and expanding the life choices of poorer
and more marginalised sectors of society In many
societies, enforcing existing national legislation in
ways that do not discriminate against the poor
would produce a social revolution. Furthermore, in
democratic settings national law has historically
provided greater opportunity for ordinary people to
influence the content and form of social regulation
to which they are subjected.
Second, national law is at this historical moment
the only regulatory order that has the potential
(however imperfectly exercised) to enforce rules
and adjudicate disputes across aU social arenas,
including international ones. The advantage of
having agents of the state enforce ones' set of rules,
or interpretation of rules, is simple: the stat&s
monopoly of legal coercion and capacity to mobilise
formidable economic and symbolic resources
behind the enforcement of rules (far greater than
that of any other national organisation) means that
state law has the potential to do 'at a sweep what
myriad of strikes, demonstrations, absenteeisms,
featherbeddings, sit-ins, marches, assassinations,
and prayer meetings [cani not, precisely because
the latter [are] inevitably local or regional, episodic,
and without legal force' (Anderson 1996:13).
The research agenda is built on the idea that
individuals and groups make decisions about how
to invest scarce resources by weighing the
consequences in relation to the different regulatory
orders in which they are embedded. Hence the
relation between state law and other regulatory
orders, and particularly the extent to which state
law has ultimate authority in the relevant social
arenas, must stand at the heart of the law-in-
development agenda. The choice to comply with or
use the rules of a particular regulatory order is
almost certainly contingent on a large number of
factors, some of which are highly context specific.
The research programmes, however, can identify
more general features of different regulatory orders
and the context in which they are situated.
The illustrations of rural collective action in Brazil
make clear that the impact of law is contingent on
both legal doctrine and on how a range of non-legal
factors configure. As Nader points out in this
volume, how people fare in a legal system is
context-specific and depends on broader social
conditions.'° We therefore need to look broadly at
the factors that influence the form law as practice
takes and how differentially situated groups comply
and use law.
Three sets of factors appear to be particularly
important candidates for further research. The
discussion that follows highlights their significance
for the choices people make about whether or not
to engage in overtly collective political activity This
reflects both the author's biases and the importance
of such actions to the ability of the poor to interpret
and use law. There is in fact little systematic
research on how law influences the processes
through which poorer social groups acquire the
ability to engage in collective public claim making
(McCann 1998:78). The factors below are
nonetheless relevant to all three research
programmes alluded to earlier.
5.1 Justice system: legal doctrine and
organisation
Some general dimensions of formal legal systems
influence whether, and how, people comply with
and use state law. One can look at specific features
of legal doctrine or organisation, such as the
presence of specific justiciable rights, or at more
generic features that can be compared across legal
systems. Good candidates in the latter category
include:
certainty and enforceability of legal rules, which
make it rational for people to invest in using
legal procedures to make claims or simply to
respect the law. Uncertainty over how police, the
courts, and state agencies will respond to
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attempts at collective claim making, not to the
claims themselves, will influence the likelihood
that people will engage in such activities.
accessibility of judicial and administrative
institutions, that is, how comprehensible,
affordable and fair/trustworthy the system is
perceived to be by ordinary citizens.
availability of mediation between poor people and
the specialised judicial institutions, such as
'barefoot lawyers', legal advocacy NGOs, and
public legal aid.
social embeddedness of law in terms of language,
history, symbols etc. Embeddedness may affect
the legitimacy of a system and the facility with
which people can gain access to and use it.
5.2 State as 'law-bound authority't'
The degree to which the state is law-bound (i.e. rule
of law prevails) has a profound influence on the
enforceability, certainty, and security of rights under
the law. The cost of engaging in collective action is
significantly lower when agents of the state are
required to protect groups from intimidation and
violence by state and non-state actors, to guarantee
negative rights such as freedom of association,
speech and press, and to ensure due process in legal
proceedings. This last issue is of great concern in a
number of low- and middle-income countries and
relates directly to the ability of the state to enforce
rights and assert its rules over those of other
regulatory orders.
5.3 Political regime dynamics
The degree to which national regime institutions are
democratic and competitive - and competition is
based on interests rather than patronclient
relations - has a significant impact on how people
can use law as a resource. It is likely to influence the
ways in which the poor are able to claim rights or
gain access to legal institutions, as well as how
judges and other actors will interpret and use law.
Authoritarian and democratic regimes apply and
enforce legal rules in quite different ways, at least in
the area of civil and political rights. More generally,
the degree to which a regime is democratic and
competitive, and to which competition is based on
interests rather than patronclient relations,
influences which legal rules are enforced and for
what groups. Such regime features also influence
whether mediators and allies are available to help
poorer social groups navigate the legal system and
access key judicial and administrative institutions.
Although this section sets out preliminary ideas for
a long-term research agenda, the preceding analysis
does point to more directly policy-oriented research
as well. Such research, for example, could focus
productively on what kinds of organisations are
effective legal mediators for poor social groups. The
hope would be to identify generic features of such
organisations that, in their social and political
context, make them particularly effective mediators,
rather than differentiate between categories of
organisations such as NGOs, public legal aid,
church groups and so forth. Policy-oriented
research could also give us a much needed sense of
how poor groups perceive the law (for example, its
relevance to their lives and its legitimacy), and
through which mechanisms they learn what their
rights and entitlements are as citizens, and what
legal-procedure remedies are available to them.
Acquiring such knowledge entails undertaking
survey research across several national contexts.
6 Concluding Thoughts
One of the central questions a law-in-development
agenda must explore is how, and how much, law
influences the difficult life choices people or groups
make about how to invest scarce economic and
social resources in enterprises of production and
political expression (i.e. wealth and voice creation).
Exploration of this question can be guided by a
view of law that focuses not only on substantive
legal doctrine and specialised justice organisations
of the state, but also on the socio-legal practices that
are produced as differentially situated actors
attempt to enforce, comply with and use legal rules.
In this broad conception, law impinges on peopleb
lives not just when they enter into contact with
judicial institutions and enforcement agencies such
as the police, but also with public agencies that
regulate a variety of activities (from land use to
voter registration). This view suggests a form of
reciprocal causality: legal doctrine and practices
shape life choices as people seek to comply and use
law; and in their efforts to comply and use law
people reinterpret legal doctrine and create new
practices. In this sense, we make the law and the
law makes us.
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Michael Anderson, Richard Crook and Laura Nader.
Hence Trubeck (1972:6) observes, by professing tobe
the manifestation of reason, and treating all men as
equals, modern law legitimates the state.'
For recent views see Garth and Sarat (1998); Benda-
Beckmann (1989); and Vanderlinden (1989); and the
articles of Benda-Beckmann and Woodman in this
volume.
Thelen and Steinmo (1992:8-9); Powell and
DtMaggio (1991); Katznelson (1997); Krasner (1984);
Hall (1986); Kitschelt (1986).
These different conceptions of institutions are perhaps
best exemplified by the new institutional economics of
North (1990) and the historical institutionalism of
Skocpol (1992).
The justice system consists of agents of the state, such
as judiciary, public prosecutors, enforcement agencies
such as the police, and the prison system.
In the context of judicial proceedings the concept of
rule-scepticism captures this reality well (Llewellyn
1989).
These changes in effect extended to rural areas a
version of the corporatist labour framework prevalent
in urban centres since the 1930s. Legally rural
workers included agricultural labourers, workers in
cattle raising or extractive production, independent
workers (tenants, squatters), and smallholders.
Por insightful ideas on how these questions might be
tackled, see Charles TilIy Durable Inequalities (1998).
Nader (1990:xviii) also notes that several studies of
'user patterns' show that the use of state law may vary
inversely with the strength of other kinds of social
control.
11 The capacity of agents of the state to act to secure
compliance with state law is a different matter that
also deserves attention. State agents attempt to enforce
compliance with legislation and other sets of legal
norms through a variety of strategies. The extent to
which they are able to do so, however, is significantly
influenced by the coherence and efficacy of the state
apparatus. For an interesting discussion of
enforcement strategies in the area of environmental
legislation, comparing the United States and European
Community experience, see Vogel and Kessler (1998).
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